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Big Brother Riding Shotgun:
Internal Surveillance of Semi-Autonomous Vehicles




The makers of autonomous vehicles (AVs) claim that their vehicles will
reduce traffic accidents by 90 per cent and save millions of lives.1 Although this is
yet to be proven, even if these new generation cars are made to be everything that
the carmakers claim, accidents will still happen. Now, as the technology is
progressing, governments and scholars are trying to come up with solutions to
many legal, ethical and sociological problems the AVs will bring along.
Full autonomy is still far away, but semi-autonomous cars, which are listed
as level 2 and 3 at the Society of Automotive Engineers’ (SAE) Levels of
Autonomy,2 are now available for public use. Level 2 is listed as ‘‘partial
automation”, where the ‘‘[v]ehicle has combined automated functions, like
acceleration and steering, but the driver must remain engaged with the driving
task and monitor the environment at all times.”3 Level 3 means ‘‘conditional
automation” and although a driver has to be present, the driver is not required to
monitor the environment at all times. However, the driver must still be ‘‘ready to
take control of the vehicle at all times with notice.”4
One of the major challenges of this technology is its impact on privacy. AVs
produce and collect a lot of data that contain personal information through GPS
localisation, cameras, sensors, etc. Most of this data production is done
‘‘externally”; the vehicle uses sensors and cameras to monitor the road and other
factors (e.g. other vehicles, pedestrians) thus creating a lot of data concerning the
* LL.B, LL.M (Private Law), LL.M. with Concentration in Law and Technology (cand.),
University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law. The author would like to thank professors Ian
Kerr, Teresa Scassa and Elizabeth Judge of the University of Ottawa for their support
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1 Adrienne LaFrance, ‘‘Self-Driving Cars Could Save 300,000 Lives Per Decade in
America”, The Atlantic (29 September 2015), online: < www.theatlantic.com/technol-
ogy/archive/2015/09/self-driving-cars-could-save-300000-lives-per-decade-in-america/
407956/>.
2 United States Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety




vehicle’s interaction with traffic and the surroundings. GPS localisation data can
also be considered as external, even though the potential harm of the data is
towards the privacy of the driver, the GPS system tracks the vehicle’s movements
and does not collect any information regarding the interior of the vehicle. The
collected data through the vehicle’s interactions with the world outside the
vehicle present privacy concerns for both the driver of the vehicle and the parties
the car detects through its technology, such as other drivers or pedestrians.
However, this article will focus on a new practice that produces more challenging
privacy issues in the current level 2 and 3 autonomous vehicles.5 Due to the level
of the technology in these vehicles, the automakers are designing systems to
monitor the interior of the vehicle to detect driver engagement in order to shift
the blame to an inattentive driver in case of an accident. This practice of internal
surveillance of the vehicle raises novel privacy concerns for the drivers and
passengers of these vehicles.
In Canadian jurisprudence, it has been accepted that individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their vehicles and are protected from
unreasonable searches of the state under s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (Charter).6 This article examines the concept of internal
surveillance and identifies how the individuals’ reasonable expectation of
privacy will be affected by the introduction of semi-autonomous vehicles that
use internal surveillance methods.7
II. INTERNAL SURVEILLANCE IN LEVEL 2 & 3 AVS AND THE
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
Level 2 and 3 AVs are not equipped to handle all of the driving features of
the vehicle and drivers are advised by the automakers not to rely only on these
technologies.8 However, we have seen in the Tesla crash in 20169 and the Uber
5 For a broader investigation of the privacy implications of automated and connected
vehicles (including external privacy interests and vehicle information systems) inCanada
see Teresa Scassa, Jennifer A Chandler & Elizabeth F Judge, ‘‘Privacy by the Wayside:
The New Information Superhighway, Data Privacy and the Deployment of Intelligent
Transportation Systems” (2011) 74 Sask L Rev 87; Ian Kerr & Jason Millar, ‘‘Will
Privacy Be the Next Moral Crumple Zone?” (2018) Report to Transport Canada
[unpublished]; Philippa Lawson, ‘‘TheConnectedCar:Who Is in theDriver’s Seat?—A
study on privacy and onboard vehicle telematics technology” (2015) British Columbia
Freedom of Information and Privacy Association, online: <fipa.bc.ca/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/CC_report_lite.pdf>; Senate of Canada, Standing Senate
Committee on Transport and Communications, Driving Change — Technology and the
Future of the Automated Vehicle (January 2018) (Chair: David Tkachuk), online:
<sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/TRCM/Reports/COM_RPT_TRC-
M_AutomatedVehicles_e.pdf>.
6 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11.
7 Disclosure of this data to the private sector is an equal and significant threat to the
individual’s privacy rights, but is not in the scope of this article.
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crash in 201810 (and other small and non-lethal crashes) that technology
enthusiasts tend to over-rely on the capabilities of these vehicles despite the
warnings.11 In order to shift the blame to the inattentive driver and avoid legal
liability and media backlash, the carmakers now want to see what is going on
inside the vehicle, through sensors and driver-facing cameras.12 The
manufacturers claim that this is a safety measure and that by making sure the
driver is paying attention, the driver assistance systems will be able to operate as
intended. However, the internal monitoring of vehicles creates a novel threat to
individual privacy and has the potential to move from a safety feature to a
widespread surveillance method, affecting the individual’s Charter rights in a
direct and substantial manner.
Section 8 of the Charter, which states that everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures, protects the privacy of Canadians
against intrusions of the state. The concept of reasonable expectation of privacy
is the corner stone of a s. 8 analysis: if a reasonable expectation of privacy does
not exist in a given situation, the search or seizure by the state will not violate the
individual’s s. 8 rights.13 If it is established that the individual had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the particular circumstances, then the analysis proceeds
to the second step, which is to determine whether the search or seizure conducted
by the state was reasonable or not.14 Therefore, as the first step to a Charter
analysis, it is crucial to determine the existence of a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
8 Tesla, ‘‘Model S Owner’s Manual” (17 December 2018) at 80-94, online: <www.tesla.-
com/sites/default/files/model_s_owners_manual_north_america_en_us.pdf>.
9 Danny Yadron, ‘‘Tesla Driver Dies in First Fatal CrashWhile Using Autopilot Mode”
The Guardian (1 July 2016), online: <www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/30/
tesla-autopilot-death-self-driving-car-elon-musk>.
10 Chaim Gartenberg, ‘‘Safety Driver of Fatal Self-Driving Uber Crash was Reportedly
Watching Hulu at Time of Accident” The Verge (22 June 2018), online: <www.the-
verge.com/2018/6/22/17492320/safety-driver-self-driving-uber-crash-hulu-police-re-
port>.
11 Withmisleading names such as ‘‘autopilot” and overly ambitious statements, carmakers
are part to blame for the ‘‘automation bias” in drivers: Kerr &Millar, supra note 5 at 1.
12 Although many different tools are being developed, for relevance, I will focus on two
technologies that are being widely used in today’s AVs: driver sensors (Tesla) and facial
recognition tools (Cadillac).
13 R. v.Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, [1992] S.C.J. No. 16 (S.C.C.) at para. 4; R. v.M. (M.R.),
[1998] 3 S.C.R. 393, [1998] S.C.J.No. 83 (S.C.C.) at para. 31;R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC67,
[2004] S.C.J.No. 63 (S.C.C.) at para. 18;R. v. Evans, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, [1996] S.C.J.No. 1
(S.C.C.) at para. 11; BarbaraMcIsaac, Rick Shields &Kris Klein, The Law of Privacy in
Canada, Student Edition (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2018) at 2-14.
14 R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, 2014 CarswellSask 342, [2014] S.C.J. No. 43 at para. 68 (‘‘A
searchwill be reasonable if: (a) it was authorized by law; (b) the law itself was reasonable;
and (c) the search was carried out in a reasonable manner”) (S.C.C.) [Spencer].
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A. The Current Approach to the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy of
Drivers and Passengers
It has been accepted in Canadian jurisprudence that drivers have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their vehicles.15 This expectation is not as
high as one would enjoy in one’s home due to the fact that driving is a regulated
activity and needs monitoring for the public good.16 Nevertheless, Canadian
drivers’ privacy in their automobiles is protected under the Charter from the
prying eyes of the state.17
The expectation of privacy of non-owner drivers and passengers are not
always that straightforward. In Belnavis the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)
addressed both of these issues. Regarding ownership, the SCC found that the
driver, who was driving her boyfriend’s car, had control of the vehicle and
therefore had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.18 The SCC assessed the
reasonable expectation of privacy of the passenger and emphasised that ‘‘whether
a passenger will have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle will depend
upon the totality of the circumstances”.19 Applying the test in R. v. Edwards,20
the SCC took into consideration that even though the passenger was present at
the time of the search, there was no evidence that she had any control over the
vehicle or had any relationship with the driver which would establish some
special access to the vehicle.21 As a result, the SCC concluded that the passenger
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.22 However, the court also
stated that a ‘‘privileged” passenger in the car, such as a spouse or someone with
whom the driver was sharing responsibilities on a journey, might have a
reasonable expectation of privacy.23
15 R. v. Belnavis, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341, [1997] S.C.J. No. 81 (S.C.C.) [Belnavis] at para. 19;
Wise, supra note 13 at para. 7; McIsaac, Shields & Klein, supra note 13 at 2-58.34.
16 Belnavis, supra note 15 at para. 39;R. v. Harrison, 2009 SCC 34, 2009 CarswellOnt 4108,
[2009] S.C.J. No. 34 (S.C.C.) at para. 30; R. v. Grunwald, 2010 BCCA 288, 2010
CarswellBC 1392, [2010] B.C.J. No. 1088 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 36.
17 However, courts found that individuals who abandon their vehicle do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy: R. v. Ellis, 2013 ONSC 1494, [2013] O.J. No. 1274
(Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) at para. 102; R. v. Cuff, 2015 ONSC 6324, [2015] O.J. No. 5967 (Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.) at para. 51.
18 Belnavis, supra note 15 at para. 19.
19 Ibid at para. 22.
20 [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, 1996 CarswellOnt 1916, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11 (S.C.C.) at para 45.
21 Belnavis, supra note 15 at para. 22.
22 Taking the same approach, a Nova Scotia court also concluded that the passengers did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy stating that ‘‘there is no evidence that the
two passengers exercised any control whatsoever over the vehicle or had an ability to
exercise access or regulate access to the vehicle”: R. v. Curren, 2003 NSPC 33, 2003
CarswellNS 293 (N.S. Prov. Ct.) at para. 16.
23 Belnavis, supra note 15 at para. 22. Using this analysis, an Ontario court found that the
passengers in the vehicle had a reasonable expectation of privacy: ‘‘I have taken into
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The courts have also addressed the reasonable expectation of privacy in
commercial vehicles and have found that ‘‘the expectation of privacy in a
commercial carrier is less than it is in a private automobile which in turn is less
than it is in a residence”.24
B. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Level 2 and 3 AVs
The main technologies used for the internal surveillance of a semi-
autonomous vehicle are sensors and cameras. Tesla uses a combination of
hands-on-wheel torsion sensors with visual and audio alerts. Accordingly, it does
not record any images of the interior,25 but will record the driver’s use of the
steering wheel, his or her driving habits and whether he or she has obeyed the
instructions of the system or not. The Cadillac Super Cruise (SC) has a more
sophisticated internal tracking system. The SC uses a face-detection camera
aimed at the driver and when the car detects that the driver’s eyes are not on the
road, the system starts giving warnings. If these warnings are ignored, the vehicle
eventually comes to a controlled stop, as does a Tesla when its sensors’ warnings
are ignored. Cadillac claims that the SC does not record any footage but only
makes sure that the driver pays attention.26
1. Charter Rights of the AV Driver
It has been established above that a driver has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the vehicle. Therefore, a search without proper lawful authority would
be unconstitutional and would violate the driver’s Charter rights. While an
owner-driver always enjoys this right, a non-owner driver will need to
demonstrate control over the vehicle. Will this outcome change in the case of
access to the collected data from an AV?
Some technologies that are in use today offer us the chance to see the courts’
interpretation about expectations of privacy in data collected by a vehicle. In R.
account that the accused appeared to be friends, and all of them were present when the
vehicle was stopped and subsequently searched. In addition, each of them was to some
extent in a position to admit or exclude others from entering the vehicle”: R. v. Emsley,
[2006] O.J. No. 5476, 2006 CarswellOnt 8821, 73 W.C.B. (2d) 536 (Ont. S C.J.) at para.
35.Also see:R. v.Gauthier, 1998CarswellOnt 4636, 40W.C.B. (2d) 283 (Ont.Ct. J. (Gen.
Div.)) at paras 48-49.
24 R. v. Sadeghi, 2007 SKQB 120, 2007 CarswellSask 197, 297 Sask.R. 96 (Sask. Q.B.) at
para. 38; see also R. v. Nolet, 2010 SCC 24, 2010 CarswellSask 368, [2010] S.C.J. No. 24
(S.C.C.).
25 Tesla added a driver-facing camera to the Model 3, which could potentially be used for
driver monitoring purposes, but the device is currently not activated: Fred Lambert,
‘‘Tesla Chose Not to Add Eye-Tracking to Autopilot Because It’s Ineffective, says Elon
Musk” Electrek (14 May 2018), online: <electrek.co/2018/05/14/tesla-eye-tracking-
autopilot-ineffective-elon-musk/>.
26 Andrew J Hawkins, ‘‘Cadillac has a Secret Weapon in its Quest to Beat Tesla at Self-
Driving” The Verge (15 April 2017), online: <www.theverge.com/2017/4/15/15289194/
cadillac-super-cruise-lidar-map-interview-ny-auto-show>.
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v. Hamilton,27 an Ontario court had to decide whether the police violated the
applicant’s Charter rights after accessing the data held on his car’s Airbag
Control Module (ACM) which contained information regarding the vehicle’s
speed and braking in the seconds leading up to a fatal accident. The court
concluded that the driver had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data that
was stored in the ACM and the warrantless access constituted a breach of his
Charter rights. One year later, in R. v. Glenfield,28 the contents of the applicant’s
vehicle’s Event Data Recorder (EDR) were in issue and the court reiterated the
ruling in Hamilton and decided that the warrantless access to the EDR data
constituted a breach of the applicant’s Charter rights.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA) came to a different
conclusion in R. v. Fedan.29 In this case, the court found that the appellant did
not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the car’s sensing
diagnostic module (SDM)30 because the SDM did not provide any data with
personal identifiers.31 The court also stated that the information regarding the
last five seconds before the crash was not private as the activity was in public and
witnesses had given statements regarding the erratic driving of the appellant.32
The verdict in Fedan is significant and important to analyze in the context of
AVs. The court stated that the SDM ‘‘did not capture any information that
revealed intimate details of Mr. Fedan’s biographical core, and in particular
about who was driving the car. Further evidence had to be obtained to connect
the driving of his vehicle to Mr. Fedan himself”.33
How would the courts evaluate the data extracted from Tesla’s wheel torque
sensor or Cadillac’s face detection cameras? It can be expected that the courts in
Hamilton and Glenfield would accept that the drivers’ reasonable expectation of
privacy exists in the data produced by these systems. The B.C. Court in Fedan
might disagree; Tesla’s sensor or Cadillac’s camera do not record the person per
se, but keep a log of their actions. The court could reiterate its position and state
that these systems do not capture any personal information. However, stating
that the SDM’s data does not include any personal information is not an
accurate assessment: the system records the driver’s interactions with the car,
which is information about the driver, not the car.34 Furthermore, even if the
27 2014 ONSC 447, 2014 CarswellOnt 1873, [2014] O.J. No. 747 (Ont. S.C.) [Hamilton].
28 2015 ONSC 1304, 2015 CarswellOnt 3290, [2015] O.J. No. 1212 (Ont. S.C.) [Glenfield].
29 2016 BCCA 26, 2016 CarswellBC 112, [2016] B.C.J. No. 91 (B.C. C.A.) [Fedan].
30 SDMhas the same functionswith theEDRandACMsystemsmentioned. These systems
are for the deployment of airbags but also record information about the car in the last few
seconds before a crash.
31 A Quebec court took the same approach and decided that the driver didn’t have a
reasonable expectation of privacy on the airbag system data as it didn’t reveal any
personal information: R. c. Gauthier, [2003] J.Q. no 7370, J.E. 2003-1473 (C. Q.).
32 Fedan, supra note 29 at para. 84.
33 Ibid at para. 81.
34 Teresa Scassa, ‘‘TheReasonable Expectation of Privacy andYourCar’sAirbag System”
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court’s position on SDMs were to be accepted, it must be noted that there is a
significant distinction between SDM’s data and the data collected via the new
technologies in AVs. The SDM reveals very limited technical information only
for the last five seconds before a crash, whereas a sensor or camera system will
continuously record data and keep logs on the driver’s choices and behaviour.
Therefore, even in the early stages of these technologies, where actual footage is
not yet being recorded, an unauthorized access to these logs and records will
violate the driver’s informational privacy and trigger the his or her Charter
rights.
Although carmakers claim that no identifiable information is collected and
nothing is recorded at the current technology level of sensors and cameras, the
collection of data will continue to increase as these systems become more familiar
to users.35 As internal monitoring increases and gets even more ‘‘personal”, the
BCCA’s misinterpretation of the collected data and the verdict in Fedan will be
irrelevant. In any case, no matter what type of information is received from the
AVs – whether it contains logs of sensor movements or actual footage of the
interior – the driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy.36
2. Charter Rights of the AV’s Non-owner Driver and Passenger
The SCC found in Belnavis that non-owner drivers who are driving the car
with permission of the owner and are in a position to exhibit control over the car
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in it and are secure against physical
searches.37 In Glenfield, the informational privacy of the non-owner driver was
protected and the fact that the he was not the owner of the vehicle did not affect
Teresa Scassa (blog) (3 November 2014), online: <www.teresascassa.ca/index.php?op-
tion=com_k2&view=item&id=172:thereasonable-expectation-of-privacy-and-your-
cars-airbag-system&Itemid=80>.
35 TheGerman ‘‘Intelligent Car Interior” project: ‘‘We are expanding sensor technology to
the entire interior . . . Using depth-perception cameras, we capture the vehicle’s interior,
identify the number of people, their size and their posture. From this we can deduce their
activities.” Fraunhofer, ‘‘Camera-based Technology Tracks People in Car Interiors” (1
August 2016), online: <www.fraunhofer.de/en/press/research-news/2016/august/cam-
era-based-technology-tracks-people-in-car-interiors.html> [Fraunhofer].
36 It must be noted that establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy does not
necessarily mean that this data cannot be obtained by the state. Government
organizations can acquire personal information in which the individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy through judicial and lawful processes, such as a production order.
In such a situation, even though the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy,
the disclosure of information to state will not be in violation of his or her Charter rights.
Accordingly, the goal of this article is not to claim that this datawill never be procured by
the state, rather is to claim that the state cannot obtain this data at will, without going
through the necessary judicial processes that essentially provide a screening mechanism.
Therefore, considering that any incident regarding the AV might justify reasonable
grounds for such a court order, the effectiveness of the screeningmechanism,which is not
in the scope of this paper, will be as important in protecting individuals’ privacy.
37 Belnavis, supra note 15 at para. 19.
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his expectation of privacy as he demonstrated control over the vehicle.38
Therefore, it can be concluded that a non-owner driver will have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the data that has been collected by the AV as long as he
or she has the consent of the owner to operate the vehicle and has demonstrated
control over it.
At the current state of the technology the sensors and cameras are not yet
capturing passengers. Therefore, the territorial privacy approach established in
Belnavis, which has since been consistently adopted by courts in subsequent case
law, will still be valid for the current AVs.39 This does not mean that a passenger
can never have a privacy interest within a vehicle. Courts found that passengers
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their specific belongings within a
car40 and in cases where they were asked for identification without reasonable
grounds.41 However, in the context of AVs, since the current internal surveillance
practices that are examined in this paper are not aimed at the passengers, the
determinative factor will be the passengers’ ability to establish a reasonable
expectation of privacy concerning the vehicle itself and their ability to challenge
the search of the vehicle. Therefore, in the current state of the technology, the
passenger would need to demonstrate control or a ‘‘privileged access” to the
vehicle, as determined by Belnavis. This conclusion will change when the current
means of internal surveillance develop to a point where it exceeds the driver and
the entire interior of the AVs are recorded. As a result of this surveillance, the
informational privacy of the passengers will emerge, changing the conception of
the reasonable expectation of privacy of a passenger. In this case, the passenger
38 Glenfield, supra note 28.
39 In a recent case, R. v. Steele, 2015 ONCA 169, [2015] O.J. No. 1253 (Ont. C.A.) at para.
20, theOntario Court ofAppeal decided that a passenger, whowas in a vehicle owned by
his mother, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. In reaching
this conclusion, the ONCA cited Belnavis and determined that even though the car
belonged to a family member, the appellant did not identify himself as the person to
whom the car had been loaned and as a result did not demonstrate control over it: ‘‘[h]e
wasonly apassenger in a vehicle drivenbyanother personwhoclaimed tohaveborrowed
the car . . . the driver was attempting to produce required documentation to police, and
had apparent control of the vehicle.” See also R. v. Belcourt, 2012 BCSC 229, [2012]
B.C.J. No. 2632 at para. 9;R. v. Boudreau, 2006 BCSC 914, [2016] B.C.J. No. 1534 (B.C.
S.C.) at paras 54-55.
40 Although passengers will not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle and
cannot challenge the search of the vehicle, they may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy on their specific belongingswithin the vehicle. InR. v. Gregoire, 2005ABQB340,
[2005] A.J. No. 529 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 341, the court cited Belnavis to determine that
the accused did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, however
decided that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her belongings and could
challenge the search of her belongings.
41 Courts have accepted that the request by anofficer for a passenger’s identification,where
such a request was not consistent with the reason that the vehicle was stopped by the
officer, would constitute a breach of the passenger’s s. 8 rights: see R. v. Mhlongo, 2017
ONCA 562, [2017] O.J. No. 3439 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 51; R. v. Harris, 2007 ONCA 574,
[2007] O.J. No. 3185 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 44.
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would not need to establish control or a privileged access to the vehicle on
contrary to the territorial privacy approach in Belnavis. The goal of the industry
is gathering as much information as possible from the interior of the vehicle and
the interest in monitoring everyone in the vehicle has already been declared.42
Considering the rapid developments in the field, it might not be long before
passenger behaviour is monitored and when it does, the courts will need to
develop a new understanding regarding the reasonable expectation of privacy of
passengers.
C. Constitutionality of Disclosure to the State under PIPEDA and Consent
1. Disclosure of personal information in accordance with PIPEDA
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(PIPEDA)43 governs the collection, use and disclosure of personal
information in the private sector and would apply to the relationship between
the customer and the party he or she purchases or leases the AV.44 Section
7(3)(c.1)(ii) of PIPEDA allows businesses to disclose personal information to
government institutions that identify a lawful authority to request the
information for the purpose of enforcing laws in Canada. Accordingly, can
businesses disclose information obtained from the vehicle sensors to law
enforcement agencies in case of a crash or any other criminal offence?
In some cases, courts have interpreted this section of PIPEDA as an
authorised circumvention to the requirement of a court order, meaning that state
officials could access the data in the hands of private organisations simply by
requesting for the purposes of law enforcement.45 In R. v. Ward,46 the Ontario
Court of Appeal (ONCA) examined the validity of a disclosure made pursuant to
PIPEDA’s s. 7(3)(c.1)(ii). In this case, the internet service provider (ISP)
42 Fraunhofer, supra note 35.
43 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5
[PIPEDA].
44 Except in British Columbia, Alberta and Quebec, which have their own private sector
privacy legislations that have been declared substantially similar to PIPEDA in
accordance with s. 26 (2)(b) of the Act.
45 R. v. Brousseau, 2010 ONSC 6753, 2010 CarswellOnt 10252, [2010] O.J. No. 5793 (Ont.
S.C.J.) at para. 42;R. v.McNeice, 2010 BCSC1544, [2010] B.C.J.No. 2131 (B.C. S.C.) at
para. 43. Another case of relevance R. v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55, [2010] S.C.J. No. 55
(S.C.C.) [Gomboc]. In this case, the question in front of the SCC was whether the
unauthorized access to the accused’s electric consumption data violated his Charter
rights. The majority found that the accused did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy on the consumption data. One of the factors that the majority took into
consideration in reaching this conclusion was the fact that the Code of Conduct
Regulation (Alta. Reg. 160/2003, s. 10(3)(f)), which was applicable to the relationship
between the accused and the electric company, allowed disclosure to officerswho request
it for investigation purposes unless the customer explicitly requests otherwise.
46 2012 ONCA 660, 112 O.R. (3d) 321, 296 O.A.C. 298 (Ont. C.A.) [Ward].
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disclosed the internet protocol (IP) address of the accused to law enforcement in
cooperation with an ongoing child pornography case. The ONCA found that
‘‘PIPEDA does not create any police search or seizure powers” and that a court
order was required for such a disclosure.47 However, considering the grave
nature of the crime and the legitimate interest of the ISP in the disclosure, the
court concluded that the accused did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy.48
In Spencer,49 similar to Ward, the subject matter in front of the SCC was
regarding the unauthorized disclosure of the accused’s IP address by the ISP to
law enforcement in course of a child pornography investigation. The SCC agreed
with the ONCA that PIPEDA did not create any police search powers but came
to a different conclusion.50 The court found that although the considerations of
ONCA in Ward are relevant they ‘‘cannot override the clear statutory language
of s. 7(3)(c.1)(ii) of PIPEDA, which permits disclosure only if a request is made
by a government institution with ‘lawful authority’ to request the disclosure”.51
Establishing that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy on the
data, the court emphasized that ‘‘it would be reasonable for an Internet user to
expect that a simple request by police would not trigger an obligation to disclose
personal information or defeat PIPEDA’s general prohibition on the disclosure
of personal information without consent.”52 Therefore, it has been established by
the SCC in Spencer that s. 7(3)(c.1)(ii) of PIPEDA cannot be accepted as a source
for lawful authority that would override the requirement of a production order.
Accordingly, businesses cannot disclose the data collected within the AVs to state
officials relying on s. 7(3)(c.1)(ii) of PIPEDA.
2. Does the consent of the owner affect his or her Charter rights?
If the owner of the AV, as part of the sale or rental agreement, gives his or
her consent to the carmaker or dealer for the disclosure of personal information
to law enforcement agencies, how would the individual’s Charter right to be
secure from unreasonable searches be affected?
The consumer contracts of large companies are almost always one-sided and
not negotiated with the consumer. Instead, the customer gives consent by signing
a non-negotiable agreement or accepting the terms and conditions of that
company. There is a clear inequality in bargaining powers between the consumer
and the carmaker or dealer of the AV. Therefore, can it be said that the consumer
is making a conscious and voluntary choice to waive his or her Charter right to
be free from unreasonable searches?
47 Ibid at para. 46.
48 Ibid at paras. 98-107.
49 Spencer, supra note 14.
50 Ibid at para. 71.
51 Ibid at para. 63.
52 Ibid at para. 62.
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In R. v. Wills,53 the ONCA determined that in order for an individual to have
consented to what would otherwise be an unauthorized search, the consent must
be given voluntarily (either implied or express) by a person who is authorized to
give such consent and is aware of the nature and the consequences of the consent
and the waived right.54 Even though this criterion was established by the ONCA
and was later adopted by the SCC,55 it was not applied in Gomboc or Ward. In
Gomboc, although it was clear that the accused did not know or understand that
he could have opted-out from the provision that enabled the third party to
disclose information to the state, the fact that he did not opt-out was considered
to be a factor in determining the reasonable expectation of privacy. However,
while noting that the accused had the power to opt-out, the majority pointed out
that one should act cautiously when dealing with contracts of adhesion.56 The
ONCA in Ward considered the user policy agreement of the ISP, which notified
the customer that their data would be disclosed to law enforcement agencies, to
be a relevant factor in the evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.57
In Spencer, the SCC considered user policies of the ISP and came to a
different conclusion. The court found that the three documents governing the
relationship between the accused and the ISP were ‘‘confusing and equivocal in
terms of their impact on a user’s reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to
police-initiated requests for subscriber information.” As the contractual terms
pointed to PIPEDA, the court turned its attention to the legislation, ultimately
deciding that the regulation does not allow access without lawful authority.58
The SCC did not clearly define the validity of consent given in unilateral
agreements that undermine Charter rights in Spencer.59 However, in a more
recent case, Douez v. Facebook,60 the SCC examined the online contract between
a consumer and Facebook to examine the validity of a jurisdictional clause that
the consumer accepted as part of the terms and conditions of subscribing to
Facebook’s services. The court found that the contractual term was
unenforceable due to the fact that there was a ‘‘gross inequality of bargaining
power” between the parties and the importance of the ‘‘quasi-constitutional
privacy rights” that were at stake.61
53 R. v.Wills, [1992] O.J. No. 294, 12 C.R. (4th) 58, 15W.C.B. (2d) 415 (Ont. C.A.) [Wills].
54 Ibid at para. 69.
55 R. v. Borden, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145, [1994] S.C.J. No. 82, 119 D.L.R. (4th) 74 (S.C.C.) at
para. 34.
56 Gomboc, supra note 45 at para. 33.
57 Ward, supra note 46 at para. 107.
58 Spencer, supra note 14 at para. 63.
59 MarkMacAulay, ‘‘Contracts, Legislative Frameworks and theReasonable Expectation
of Privacy: Rethinking Section 8 in the Service ProvisionContext” (2015) 20CanCrimL
Rev 111 at 113.
60 2017 SCC 33, [2017] S.C.J. No. 33, 411 D.L.R. (4th) 434 (S.C.C.) [Douez].
61 Ibid at para. 76.
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The SCC’s rulings in Spencer and Douez would suggest that consent given by
the consumer within the terms and conditions for the sale or lease of the AV,
enabling the business to disclose personal information to state officials will not
be accepted as well. Although this point is not clearly indicated in Spencer, in
Douez the court clearly rejected the waiver of constitutional rights in unilateral
contracts where there is no meaningful consent. Similar to Douez, the consumers
of AVs are in a position where certain provisions are forced upon them by a
stronger party as a condition of having access to the service and the disclosure of
this data to law enforcement agencies pose a great threat for the person’s privacy
and threatens the individual’s Charter rights.
It can be argued that the purchase of an AV is non-essential and that the
customer has the chance to buy another car if he or she doesn’t want to agree to
the terms and conditions. The SCC answered a similar argument in Douez about
the complainant’s chance to use another social media platform or avoid using
any platform. The court dismissed this argument by stressing the importance of
social media and opined that the chance to stay ‘‘offline” is not possible in
today’s connected world.62 In the AV context, this argument might not be
accepted as the driver assisting features of the AVs today can be seen as a luxury
rather than a necessity. However, the reality is that many of the new vehicles on
the market today have certain features that collect personal information which
may endanger the privacy of their users. Also, even though full automation will
not be available for customers anytime soon, the development and use of semi-
autonomous vehicles is increasing every day and in the near future the classic car
will start to disappear and automated vehicles will become widespread and
perhaps the only choice.
It is also worth noting that when the internal surveillance in AVs start
capturing more than the driver, even if the driver gives a valid and explicit
consent for the disclosure of the data collected by the AV, this consent will not
have an effect on third parties, such as passengers. The SCC has determined that
third-party consent is invalid and in such a situation, driver’s consent will only
have an effect on his or her reasonable expectation of privacy.63
III. CONCLUSION
The introduction of internal surveillance methods in semi-autonomous
vehicles produces a novel privacy threat to society. As the technology becomes
more familiar and widely used, the collection of data will increase and the privacy
of a traditionally private space will be seriously compromised.
One of the significant effects of AVs on society is the threat they pose to an
individual’s Charter right of being free from unreasonable searches. The current
62 Ibid at para. 56.
63 R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53, [2012] S.C.J. No. 53, 353 D.L.R.(4th) 447 (S.C.C.) at paras. 78-
79;R. v.Reeves, 2018SCC56, [2018] S.C.J.No. 56, 427D.L.R. (4th) 579 (S.C.C.) at paras
50-52.
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jurisprudence in Canada that has been evaluated in this article demonstrates that
the introduction of AVs will not have an immediate negative affect on the
individuals’ Charter rights, at least at the current stage of the technology.
The drivers will continue to have a reasonable expectation of privacy that
will restrain the state from prying into their collected data without any lawful
authority. The passengers of private or commercial AVs who are unable to prove
a special access to the car will not have a reasonable expectation of privacy and
thus a Charter protection on their collected data. Although the current level of
surveillance tools that were examined in this paper do not pose a direct threat
towards passengers yet, this will quickly change and if courts cannot adjust their
current evaluation of passengers’ privacy in vehicles, severe privacy violations
will be inevitable in the near future.
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